At the same time those who knew precisely what needed to be done have now been left frustrated or upset with the supranational European institutions, especially the European Commission. For the sake of clarity let's just repeat a popularly-held ideal and belief: we live in a Europe that in principle favors the ‘renationalization’ of European policies over their ‘communitarisation.’ Obviously this simplistic perspective does not hold true on all fronts – nevertheless, the general tendency is more or less accurate.
In consequence of this ideal, those who knew precisely what needed to be done over Greece came up with a solution that could never have held for long – namely, that financial and budgetary oversight would be performed not by the supranational Commission, but by other fellow governments. This seemed to represent an emerging consensus of what was thought of as Berlin’s mechanism of control, but it only lasted until Slovakia entered the big picture.
There are a few crucial weaknesses inherent in the intergovernmental method. For one, the credibility of the ‘judges’ could be challenged. The 'judging panel' under this method of governance often comprises economic or finance ministers gathered together from different member states. Each 'judge' likely has his or her own domestic difficulties and pressures.
To quote the Bible, let he who is without sin cast the first stone…
The decision by the Slovak government and parliament not to contribute to the fund, which aimed at giving assistance to countries in economic difficulty – like Greece – revealed other problems with the application of the intergovernmental method within the EU legal framework. While Slovakia's planned contribution was so limited its absence didn't in the end affect the size of the fund, the fact that it pulled out raises the specter of what might have happened if a larger state, Germany, say, had withdrawn. An intergovernmental system demands unanimity among the largest players – every decision is subject to the potential veto of a single stake-holding government.
Secondly, Slovakia's withdrawal has highlighted the vulnerability of EU intergovernmental political agreements, which are always subject to reversal by a domestic parliament. In Slovakia there were elections and the new prime minister and the new parliament did not feel obliged to honor the commitments of the outgoing team of ministers. To be completely honest, they had every right to take this course of action. The real problem is that before the system was established, its vulnerabilities were already clearly visible.
So, how to square the circle? How to convince those who take future decisions that the best option is not to leave oversight in the hands of German or French finance ministers, but with the European Commissioner? How to overcome the atmosphere of distrust towards the supranational method? In reality it would take a lot of political courage to champion the supranational method. And the more difficult the domestic situation, the more vulnerable are the leaders. Italy and Spain, which are at the edge of collapse, as well as Germany and France, where leaders have record-low support, are just four examples of where it would be hard for a politician to generate support for supranational governance without alienating the electorate completely.
In conclusion, if we know what needs to be done and how it should be done, the only thing left is to convince those who will take the decision to take it properly. Mr Barroso and all the other Eurofederalists should therefore be the most happy about the Slovaks' decision. After all, following the summer entry of Slovakian Prime Minister Radicova into European politics, one can see clearly that – paradoxically – the Slovaks’ decision on the Greek fund pushes EU decision makers in the right direction: towards supranationalism.
