In July 2011, for the first time in history, Poland will take up the role of a rotating presidency of the Council of the European Union.

This is a gigantic administrative task, as there are about a 250 working groups, which will need to be chaired and managed. Nine out of the ten Council formations will be chaired by Polish ministers.

This raises a question: will the Polish state be able to meet the challenge? After all, the rotating presidencies of the two previous newer member states - Slovenia and the Czech Republic - were irrelevant or proved to be too great a challenge for the two countries respectively.

Well, there are a few factors, which will make the Poland's and Hungary's - in the first semester of 2011 - EU presidencies different.

Visibility is key

Budapest and Warsaw will hold EU rotating presidencies which will be politically headless.

The Lisbon Treaty - in force since December 2009 - has substantially limited the presidencies' political role. The two most visible positions of the pre-December 2009 presidencies were always the countries' PMs or presidents, who presided over the European Council, while the countries' foreign ministers chaired the General and External Affairs Council.

In today's reality those two highly important political functions are performed by permanent staff: the European Council President Herman Van Rompuy and the EU's foreign policy chief, Catherine Ashton.

In consequence, the 2011 Polish presidency will have almost an exclusively administrative and policy-making character and very limited political representation and visibility.

Great expectations

Timing is also important. Hungary and Poland take up their tasks seven years after enlargement. There was enough time to prepare for performing the duties effectively and efficiently. But this also means that the other member states' expectations from Budapest or Warsaw will be as high as they were from Stockholm in the second semester of 2009 or are now from Madrid.

The third factor is the size. Poland's rotating presidency is supposed to be a bigger member state presidency. Those presidencies generally have more room for taking up greater challenges - like the treaty reform during the German presidency in 2007 or the energy and climate package during the French presidency in 2008. Yet again, the greater the expectations, the larger the responsibilities.

Next July Poland may take another step in the European integration. Apart from the administrative and logistical challenges, there will be a major challenge for Polish decision-makers (including the opposition) to switch their minds from thinking about the EU as a money-giving machine to taking responsibility for the entire EU.

However, overdoing it would also be a mistake. Balancing the unknown is difficult, if not impossible.

Hungarian elections brought about a major change. After eight years of left-wing governments, the right wing party Fidesz gained a constitutional majority in the parliament. Its leader, Victor Orban, became Prime Minister.

What's in it for Europe?

A conservative party now rules in yet another EU country. There are now 15 conservative heads of state or government: all members of the European People's Party.

Mr Orban's overwhelming success means that Hungary has got a strong leadership. A new trend of generating "strong leaders" seems to be emerging in Central Europe. Lithuanian President Dalia Grybauskaite was the first in the region; now Hungary follows.

Poland is almost there with Prime Minister Donald Tusk. Providing Mr Tusk's party wins the country's presidential elections on June 20, as well as the subsequent parliamentary elections in 2011, it will be able to form a one-party government.

Changes afoot

There will also be major changes in the new Hungarian foreign policy. Fidesz promised to have more active policy in the European Union.

There are two countries that are tipped to be Hungary's strongest allies in the EU: Poland and Romania. Some in Budapest talk about a new political triangle - similar to the Weimar Triangle of Poland, France and Germany, or the Visegrad Group of Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary.

Whatever the formula, one thing is sure. Poland has got a very close ally in Budapest. It is likely the first visit of the new Hungarian Foreign Minister, or maybe even the Prime Minister, will be to Warsaw. For Hungarians there are important projects to be worked on, such as North-South transport and energy corridors between the Baltic and the Adriatic seas.

Polish gains?

The change in the Hungarian political spectrum can have significant consequences for the Polish Central European policy; especially its coalition building within the EU. Poland's closest allies in the CEE region over recent years were Czech Republic and Lithuania. Relations with the Czechs became more and more complicated following internal Czech political chaos.

If in the May elections, the new Prague government were to be formed by left wing politicians, then the significance of the Polish-Czech relations could further deteriorate. In this situation Hungary emerges as a potential primary partner for Donald Tusk government in Central Europe. This cooperation can be further strengthened by the fact that two countries hold EU rotating presidencies in 2011 - Hungary in the first half, Poland in the second.

The Visegrad Group (V4) could face two developments. There could be two pairs - one with Mr Paroubek, if this Czech socialist is elected Prime Minister, and Slovakian PM Robert Fico. The second could be the Hungarian and Polish conservative-liberals. This inconsistency does not create problems as long as all four partners are dedicated to the V4 cooperation. Nevertheless some problems can originate from tensions between Slovakia and Hungary.

The second idea also originates from Budapest - Hungarians talk about "Visegrad Plus," which would virtually include all 10 CEE EU member countries. This would not undermine the V4 either - the group has proven an extremely useful instrument in the EU despite differences between states. Most likely it would not be formally enlarged, but parallel new instruments (such as Warsaw-Budapest-Bucharest trio) could be envisaged.

The arrival of Mr Orban in Budapest opens room for a geopolitical game of chess in Central Europe. Poland gains a new important ally, potentially the "new best friend" from countries in the region.

So the race is on.

Over 20 candidates have pre-registered to stand in the presidential elections on June 20. Out of this lot, only two major candidates and a minor one have a slim chance of getting the main prize, the rest is using the occasion for their nitty-gritty personal or particular causes.

So, what are they really fighting for?

Bronisław Komorowski

For Mr Komorowski, anything other than his election as president could terminate his political career. So Mr Komorowski has two objectives:

First, he is looking to eliminate major disagreements between the government and the president. He seems to be in agreement with Prime Minister Donald Tusk that there is no room in Poland for such conflict

Second, he wants to win in the first round. If the polls are correct, and some 47 percent of the public is ready to stand behind Mr Komorowski in the first round, he is not that far away from meeting this objective. Poles have never re-elected a Prime Minister to office after 1989, but they have however re-elected a president, namely President Aleksander Kwaśniewski in 2000.

Jarosław Kaczyński

Jarosław Kaczyński's decision to stand in the contest is highly controversial. He has a very small chance of winning and he is risking a lot. If Mr Kaczyński wins the election, the price he will pay is losing control over the Law and Justice (PiS) party.

However, if he loses, PiS may be marginalized, as all major political positions will be in the hand of the Civic Platform (PO). Moreover, Mr Kaczyński's leadership could be challenged within after such a tough loss. Although it's unlikely, it is conceivable that PiS's very unity could be threatened.

In short, Mr Kaczyński is running in order to make sure there is a second round in the elections and will try to maintain control over his party (this would be possible if he loses to Mr Komorowski by a narrow margin the second round).

Andrzej Olechowski

The aforementioned minor candidate is independent Andrzej Olechowski. He seems to have the money and an organization backing him, but he does not seem to have an attractive message. Mr Komorowski's theme is that he will continue the stability of the Tusk government. Mr Kaczyński's message is he will continue the legacy of his brother, President Lech Kaczyński. Mr Olechowski's anti-PO/PiS approach has had a limited response so far.

Other candidates

The other candidates are a nuisance. Many of them will have major problems collecting the 100,000 signatures required to remain in the race. Waldemar Pawlak from the Polish People's Party (PSL) is running to determine the party's popularity ahead of the next parliamentary elections.

Gregorz Napieralski of the Democratic Left Alliance (SLD) is fighting for his head as party leader. Only 12 percent or more will allow him to keep his position.

The rest of the candidates are just trying to remind the public about their mere political existence or use the opportunity as a cheap PR.