There is a piece of gossip floating around Brussels. The gist of it is this: the British want to reduce the European Union budget to 85 percent of what it is today. That is to say, that the contributions from national governments should not exceed 0.85 percent of their national GDP, compared to the current one percent.

This would effectively mean shutting down quite a few EU projects. But instead of engaging in the traditional Brussels discussion of what such a reduction would mean and what policies would have to be forgotten, let us ponder another thought.

If the British really want to shrink the EU budget to 85 percent of what it is today, they should do it themselves and do not force others to do so.

Sure, why not. After all, the UK is already only about 85 percent part of the EU anyways. With all its opt-outs in economic, monetary, justice, migration and home policies, it is not a full member of the Union any more. Step by step over the past 20 years it has separated itself from the project more and more. Hence it's fine, the British should not pay 100 percent of what the others pay, they should pay less.

Did I forget something? Oh, yes. The British already pay less. After all there is this costly elephant, this...what is it called? The British rebate. The smaller and poorer nations of the EU are paying for the British Queen’s agricultural subsidies and are sponsoring research at Europe’s best universities, which happen to be located mostly…in the UK.

So, the deal is obvious: let the rebate go, and the UK pays 85 percent of what other states pay. It would not be a new rebate, though – the UK benefits should be also reduced to 85 percent of others’ benefits.

So, MEPs elected from the UK as well as EU officials with British passports would earn 85 percent of what their colleagues make. The farm subsidies would be reduced accordingly, and the sums allocated to the British universities and research centers would shrink by 15 percent.

After all, if Britain wants to be at a partial remove, let it be so. But there's no reason for the rest of the EU to subsidize this special treatment.

On July 1, 2011, Poland will for the first time take over the rotating presidency of the Council of the European Union. For Poland to be truly successful in this role, major dedication from the country's public administration and also a measure of domestic political peace will be required. Since political peace will be impossible to obtain – the parliamentary elections are now scheduled to take place in October 2011 – let us explore what exactly the Polish government and other public actors can do in order to generate major pro-Polish momentum in the European Union in July 2011.

By far the most important move Poland could make on July 1 2011 is to join the exchange-rate mechanism, the ERM2. There have been many statements from various political players on the issue of Polish Euro accession, not all of them supportive. Indeed, the general public and the political class are deeply divided between and amongst themselves over the issue of the common currency. Accession to the ERM2 mechanism could therefore prove an important gesture of unity, without actually committing Poland to joining the euro zone at a specific date.

Secondly, there is the issue of the Polish opt-out from applying the Charter of Fundamental Rights on Polish soil. This topic could be revisited with a parliamentary adoption of the text of the Charter and its introduction into domestic law. Alternatively, the Polish government could propose an amendment to the Union Treaties on the issue (by i.e. shifting the reference to Poland into Czech Republic, which requested to be granted the same opt-out as Poland and the UK have). Changing individual parts of an EU treaty has become a standard process, as there is already a procedure which allows for this within the Union (altering the number of seats in the European Parliament). Moreover, the President of the European Council, Herman van Rompuy, is now preparing a new treaty change on economic governance.

The third key issue Poland should address on its accession to the Council presidency – the country's adherence to the enhanced cooperation on divorce laws – would cost Poland nothing, but would nevertheless take some political courage. The issue concerns closer cooperation among certain EU members on applying divorce laws. This would help Polish citizens, who either live abroad and/or are married to a foreigner, in clarifying which law applies in their case if they want to file for divorce. In Poland this should be a technicality, but the Polish government pretends this is a non-issue, as it could (but in my assessment, would not) potentially open another debate in the country about a moral topic. The government fears that the Catholic Church would oppose enhanced cooperation, but in fact the Church has so far not actively opposed the issue in other countries in the EU where the enhanced cooperation is being applied.

The fourth issue Poland should deal with concerns the Polish contribution to something termed the “European public sphere” – the unofficial space where problems concerning Europe can be discussed and debated. It is often said that such a sphere hardly exists and that the only elements in the audio-visual world that unify Europeans are the Champions League, the Eurovision song contest and the Eurosport TV channel. In the political sphere there is Euronews, a news channel on EU affairs. It broadcasts in a number of languages, including Russian and Turkish, but not in Polish. It would take Telewizja Polska to become actively engaged (maybe with a grant from the government) in order for Euronews to start broadcasting in Polish, too. Should the channel start operating in Polish on July 1, 2011, that would be a major mental breakthrough for the Brussels EU headquarters in internalising the 2004 enlargement.

How to square a circle? There are many in Europe who know precisely what needs to be done in the current crisis situation: increase oversight over member states so that no Greek-type situation occurs in the future. In the first few months of 2010 the European Union experienced – for the first time – a situation of ‘forced solidarity’, in which European states had to support the Greeks. The only question then was: how.

At the same time those who knew precisely what needed to be done have now been left frustrated or upset with the supranational European institutions, especially the European Commission. For the sake of clarity let's just repeat a popularly-held ideal and belief: we live in a Europe that in principle favors the ‘renationalization’ of European policies over their ‘communitarisation.’ Obviously this simplistic perspective does not hold true on all fronts – nevertheless, the general tendency is more or less accurate.

In consequence of this ideal, those who knew precisely what needed to be done over Greece came up with a solution that could never have held for long – namely, that financial and budgetary oversight would be performed not by the supranational Commission, but by other fellow governments. This seemed to represent an emerging consensus of what was thought of as Berlin’s mechanism of control, but it only lasted until Slovakia entered the big picture.

There are a few crucial weaknesses inherent in the intergovernmental method. For one, the credibility of the ‘judges’ could be challenged. The 'judging panel' under this method of governance often comprises economic or finance ministers gathered together from different member states. Each 'judge' likely has his or her own domestic difficulties and pressures.

To quote the Bible, let he who is without sin cast the first stone…

The decision by the Slovak government and parliament not to contribute to the fund, which aimed at giving assistance to countries in economic difficulty – like Greece – revealed other problems with the application of the intergovernmental method within the EU legal framework. While Slovakia's planned contribution was so limited its absence didn't in the end affect the size of the fund, the fact that it pulled out raises the specter of what might have happened if a larger state, Germany, say, had withdrawn. An intergovernmental system demands unanimity among the largest players – every decision is subject to the potential veto of a single stake-holding government.

Secondly, Slovakia's withdrawal has highlighted the vulnerability of EU intergovernmental political agreements, which are always subject to reversal by a domestic parliament. In Slovakia there were elections and the new prime minister and the new parliament did not feel obliged to honor the commitments of the outgoing team of ministers. To be completely honest, they had every right to take this course of action. The real problem is that before the system was established, its vulnerabilities were already clearly visible.

So, how to square the circle? How to convince those who take future decisions that the best option is not to leave oversight in the hands of German or French finance ministers, but with the European Commissioner? How to overcome the atmosphere of distrust towards the supranational method? In reality it would take a lot of political courage to champion the supranational method. And the more difficult the domestic situation, the more vulnerable are the leaders. Italy and Spain, which are at the edge of collapse, as well as Germany and France, where leaders have record-low support, are just four examples of where it would be hard for a politician to generate support for supranational governance without alienating the electorate completely.

In conclusion, if we know what needs to be done and how it should be done, the only thing left is to convince those who will take the decision to take it properly. Mr Barroso and all the other Eurofederalists should therefore be the most happy about the Slovaks' decision. After all, following the summer entry of Slovakian Prime Minister Radicova into European politics, one can see clearly that – paradoxically – the Slovaks’ decision on the Greek fund pushes EU decision makers in the right direction: towards supranationalism.

The idea of having organizations which, in a series of summits, allow informal meetings between heads of state or governments from the most important and influential states in the world was sound in its conception. It provides key global figures with a place to interact, which often serves to ease tensions or even prevent conflicts. In the Cold War era it was an excellent medium for the exchange of ideas among the richest on the planet.

But today this formula needs a serious re-appraisal.

The members of the G7 were: the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Italy and Japan. In late-1997, the G7 became the G8, when Russia was added to the group.

Since the 1990s EU leaders, including the president of the European Commission, also began attending the organization's meetings. In the end, 10 leaders participated in the G8's June meeting in Toronto; six of them were European: French President Sarkozy, German Chancellor Merkel, UK Prime Minister David Cameron and Italy's PM Berlusconi. The two EU Presidents, (President of the European Commission) José Manuel Barroso and (President of the European Council) Herman Van Rompuy, also  attended.

In the end, the June summit was a joke. Europe has for a long time been usurped as the geopolitical and economic center of the world, and G8 meetings – which include four European states – are now not much more than diplomatic niceties writ large. Certainly, they are no longer forums where global business is truly taken care of.

The rise of China and other emerging nations means international institutions must be reformed. The compositions of the G8 and the UN Security Council no longer reflect the global distribution of power.

So far, the creation of the G20 represents a move towards making such changes. But this group is diluted and responsibility is no longer taken at an individual level – hence people rightly say that the decisions in fact are taken elsewhere.

As an alternative, maybe a G2 should be established (if it not already in practice), comprising the US and China. But perhaps this would be too simplistic.

So, here's another idea: for a group of global leaders to make real changes one needs to forget about “political correctness.” Such groups cannot be too inclusive, otherwise decisions will be taken in even more secretive ways between a few unidentified leaders.

Such a group needs to include only those actors who have a weight and influence in global affairs – there is no room for those which are just regional powerhouses.

There are seven countries in the world today which would make the grade:

• The United States remains the world’s most important economic and political player.
• China is the world’s most important and influential developing nation and is soon to become the world's second-largest economy and number-one manufacturer. It is also the most populous country.
• India is the world’s largest democratic nation and its second most populous state.
• Russia is the world’s largest country (by area) and still has an enormous political and military presence on the global stage.
• Brazil, as the country which hosts the Amazon rain forest, holds the key to biodiversity in the world. It is also an important rising political and economic player not only in its own region, but across the globe.
• Japan is a major economic power, with a massive comparative advantage in innovation.
• The seventh entity which should also have a spot is the European Union – the world’s most advanced supra-governmental entity that escapes classical definitions of international organizations. As a whole it is the world’s largest economy, provides for more than half of global development assistance and aggressively promotes its original approach to international relations, which is based on international, legally binding instruments that would rule the global governance structure in areas such as trade, financial markets and climate change.

Those seven players collectively hold the key to the planet’s future. Like it or not, enlarging this list to include Canada, South Africa, Saudi Arabia, South Korea, Indonesia, Nigeria, Argentina, Mexico or Turkey would only dilute the most important players' responsibility and ability to make decisions with regard to where the world is heading.

What role would there be for Poland in this proposed system? It’s simple. Forget about Jarosław Kaczyński's illusions of Poland gaining a seat in the G20. Spain, with a GDP twice Poland's, is not even a G20 member.

What Poland should demand is not a seat for itself; it should demand that its German, French, Italian and British partners reduce their individual presence in global bodies, which at present levels does nothing but harm the collective impact of Europe in world affairs.

The last time Poles voted in June was in 1989. The highest turnout of Polish voters in parliamentary elections ever - 62 percent - was recorded then.

Will we see another such mobilization of the voting public this Sunday? There are a number of reasons to be optimistic. Emotions are running high and supporters of the three main candidates have their reasons to vote for Kaczyński, Komorowski or Napieralski respectively.

The presidential elections are usually more popular among voters than the somewhat complex parliamentary polls. In the presidential elections, constituents vote state-wide for one person. The message is clear. There will be no coalition negotiations, preferential voting, or 10-page lists of candidates to choose from.

One page, a few names and just one "X" is necessary.

The fair summer weather is also a factor. The chances are good that it will be a sunny, warm day - perfect for going out to vote.

The choice at hand

So, what is the choice? The choice is quite simple. Sejm Speaker and Acting President Bronisław Komorowski says he wants to end the Polish-Polish war. His presidency will most likely be focused on engaging the public.

Unlike his predecessors, who either fought palace wars (Lech Wałęsa 1990-1995, Aleksander Kwaśniewski 2001-2005), or positioned themselves in fierce opposition to the government (Aleksander Kwaśniewski 1997-2001, Lech Kaczyński 2007-2010), Mr Komorowski dreams of a period for Poland where all the branches of government serve one purpose and one purpose only - rapid development of the country.

An alternative vision is presented by PiS leader Jarosław Kaczyński. He talks about ending the Polish-Polish war; but he was the one who fired the first shots of this particular edition.

It is highly unlikely that he will be elected, and he aims to get the best support possible - more then 30 percent in the first round and more then 40 percent in the second round in July.

This will reconfirm the position of the Law and Justice (PiS) as a real powerhouse in Polish politics, able to take over Parliament in the future and form a government with the Polish People's Party (PSL).

Should he become president, that would be problematic for him and his party - PiS would need to elect a new leader, and the position of number-two in the party, Zbigniew Ziobro, is by no means set in stone. Mr Kaczyński's presidency would be a repetition of that of Lech Kaczyński - with a reactive domestic policy and a confrontational - though potentially less controversial - foreign policy.

Leftist ambitions

Mr Napieralski's chances remain small. His objective is twofold. The first objective is to obtain more than about 12 percent of the vote, confirming his position as the clear leader of the Polish left.

More than 15 percent (coupled with fewer than 30 percent of the vote for Jarosław Kaczyński) could shake up the Polish political landscape in the near future and reestablish the (still) undermined credibility of the left after the debacles of the Leszek Miller government (2001-2004).

His second objective has been to try out a "smiling campaign" and to reach out to those who want a generational change in Polish politics.

The objective is to organize strong bases for the left for the fall regional elections in the big cities and ahead of the next parliamentary campaign.

The immediate consequences of a good performance by Mr Napieralski could even include the reconstruction of the Donald Tusk cabinet, and switching the junior coalition partner from PSL to SLD; or the inclusion of SLD into the PO-PSL government.

But Mr Napieralski should resist those temptations and focus on the reconstruction of the unity of the left with smaller parties such as SDPL, PD, Zieloni 2004 and the Womens' Party.

A good performance by Mr Napieralski may mean the left would have a leader; a Polish version of José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero - a dream Mr Napieralski has had for some time now.