The EU's current efforts (led by France and Germany) to rescue Greece from its colossal debt crisis will surely result in greater EU-wide scrutiny, but it could also spark a new wave of tighter economic and financial supervision. Greece's public sector, long accused of fraudulent accounting practices, corruption and tax evasion, offers sobering lessons for countries across Central Europe grappling with their own structural limitations, deficits and eurozone accession strategies.

The Greek conundrum highlights the economic limitations of establishing a monetary union without a complimentary fiscal union. Having sixteen separate fiscal policies, particularly during economic downturns, not only results in growing economic discrepancies (and animosity) between fiscally disciplined and fiscally loose member states, but enables individual members to avoid accountability to a central fiscal authority. Ultimately, this threatens the strength and stability of the euro, as we have seen in this week's sell-off.

The eurozone's debt crisis has enabled EU leaders to call for greater fiscal integration, coordination and most importantly stricter implementation of structural reforms throughout the eurozone and within those countries vying to join it. This poses challenges for countries like Poland and others throughout Central Europe which could see greater engagement from Brussels over future budget and economic policies, as creating an increasingly finer line between meeting Maastricht criteria and economic recovery.

Poland in particular will see its debt management strategy tested. It has a legally restricted debt-to-GDP ratio of 55 percent, which if surpassed would force the government to restrict borrowing and make additional cuts to public spending.

This poses challenges for several reasons. First, Poles, along with Central Europeans in four other countries, are preparing for national elections in 2010. Despite being the only EU country to avoid a severe recession, Poland's recovery is still shaky and an additional round of austerity measures will not sit well with voters.

Second, though the euro convergence plan is still aimed for 2012, it will be increasingly difficult for Poland to cut its budget deficit from almost seven percent to under three percent in less than two years.

Finally, much of Poland's debt strategy rests on the success of upcoming privatization deals and high economic growth. With the eurozone influx, the American recovery uncertain, and global trade yet to rebound, achieving this goal will be challenging. The lessons from Greece are twofold: first, rushed euro convergence, while creating short-term stability, ultimately creates larger structural economic deficiencies. Second, getting into the eurozone is just half the battle, thriving in it is another story.

In spite of relatively positive New Year's projections that estimate Poland's economy growing by approximately two percent in 2010 (one of Europe's highest rates), much of Poland's recovery will depend on successful growth within the euro zone. Currently, prospects remain challenging due to a looming European debt crisis.

By the end of 2009, bank lending across the euro zone decreased significantly, particularly to the private sector.

With the real estate market is still in decline and firms continuing to hold off hiring or making new investments, the EU economic engine seems stalled. In addition, ballooning public deficits in several euro-zone economies, including its newest (and first) Eastern members Slovakia and Slovenia, are simply unsustainable.

Not only do they threaten Europe's long-term recovery prospects, but they also raise the cost of borrowing (for both the public and private sectors) and increase the risk of inflation. This will surely affect Poland, which is dealing with its own widening public deficit as well as euro entry bid.

One major thorn in Europe's recovery is the lack of a common recovery plan. Regarding monetary policy among euro zone members, there is only so much that the European Central Bank can do. Unlike, the US, individual EU and euro zone member states, through independent fiscal and other stimulus policies, have set the recovery agenda and in many cases acted unilaterally out of self-interest rather than with the common market in mind.

Case in point is Italian carmaker Fiat considering relocating the production of its best-selling Panda back to Italy, despite Poland's lower labor and production costs, thereby addressing government demands of increasing Italy's domestic car production. Although Poland's recent success at avoiding large-scale recession rested on lower dependence on and exposure to euro zone export and credit markets, its recovery may be more closely tied to the euro zone's public debt balance and its members' short-term ability to get their fiscal houses in order.