First, local politics truly do matter. Specifically, strong institutions, a well-functioning democracy, accountability and transparency play as integral a part in a country's political development as its economic development. This was lacking among Hungary's officials and within its institutions during the peak of the crisis, which eventually manifested into protests on the streets of Budapest.
High unemployment, government incompetence and a severe economic recession triggered public outrage and increased the popularity of nationalist parties like Jobbik, which garnered 15 percent of the vote, and sent three representatives to the European Parliament in 2009. Some polls predict Jobbik may win up to 20 percent of the votes in the upcoming Parliamentary election, attracting voters from both sides of the political spectrum who continue to be disillusioned with Hungary's political mainstream and sluggish recovery.
Second, the ability to maintain relatively low macroeconomic imbalances enabled Poland to take advantage of preferential lending mechanisms and financial aid, including access to a $20.5 billion IMF flexible credit line (FCL). Not only did this help Poland avoid additional economic shocks and enable greater policy flexibility, but it also empowered the ruling PO party, while marginalizing the fringes. That was not the case in Hungary where years of political infighting and a badly mismanaged economy (on the Socialist MSZP's watch) forced Hungary into international bankruptcy.
While it is possible that Fidesz (National Conservatives) may win a constitutional two-thirds majority, the more important question is whether they will form a coalition or at the very least coalesce with Jobbik. If so, this could pose serious obstacles to an already demoralized EU (think Greece), stall further integration and damage the gains of post-communist transition.
