The EU's current efforts (led by France and Germany) to rescue Greece from its colossal debt crisis will surely result in greater EU-wide scrutiny, but it could also spark a new wave of tighter economic and financial supervision. Greece's public sector, long accused of fraudulent accounting practices, corruption and tax evasion, offers sobering lessons for countries across Central Europe grappling with their own structural limitations, deficits and eurozone accession strategies.

The Greek conundrum highlights the economic limitations of establishing a monetary union without a complimentary fiscal union. Having sixteen separate fiscal policies, particularly during economic downturns, not only results in growing economic discrepancies (and animosity) between fiscally disciplined and fiscally loose member states, but enables individual members to avoid accountability to a central fiscal authority. Ultimately, this threatens the strength and stability of the euro, as we have seen in this week's sell-off.

The eurozone's debt crisis has enabled EU leaders to call for greater fiscal integration, coordination and most importantly stricter implementation of structural reforms throughout the eurozone and within those countries vying to join it. This poses challenges for countries like Poland and others throughout Central Europe which could see greater engagement from Brussels over future budget and economic policies, as creating an increasingly finer line between meeting Maastricht criteria and economic recovery.

Poland in particular will see its debt management strategy tested. It has a legally restricted debt-to-GDP ratio of 55 percent, which if surpassed would force the government to restrict borrowing and make additional cuts to public spending.

This poses challenges for several reasons. First, Poles, along with Central Europeans in four other countries, are preparing for national elections in 2010. Despite being the only EU country to avoid a severe recession, Poland's recovery is still shaky and an additional round of austerity measures will not sit well with voters.

Second, though the euro convergence plan is still aimed for 2012, it will be increasingly difficult for Poland to cut its budget deficit from almost seven percent to under three percent in less than two years.

Finally, much of Poland's debt strategy rests on the success of upcoming privatization deals and high economic growth. With the eurozone influx, the American recovery uncertain, and global trade yet to rebound, achieving this goal will be challenging. The lessons from Greece are twofold: first, rushed euro convergence, while creating short-term stability, ultimately creates larger structural economic deficiencies. Second, getting into the eurozone is just half the battle, thriving in it is another story.

Prime Minister Donald Tusk's government swept into office in late 2007 on a pro-business platform focused on promoting privatization, competitiveness, entrepreneurialism and transparency within the Polish economy.

As Poland settles into another cold winter, increased competition within Poland's energy sector is becoming vital to its future economic development (and security) as well as that of its neighbors.

Like any wise investor, Poland too should look to mitigate risk by diversifying its portfolio of energy investors and suppliers. Poland's decision to grant exploration rights of potential shale-gas resources to two major US oil companies is a step in the right direction.

A few days ago PGNiG, Poland's state-run gas distribution monopoly, finalized a gas delivery contract lasting until 2037 with Russia's Gazprom. While improved pricing and delivery mechanisms with the Moscow-based energy giant are positive developments for bilateral relations - especially after last winter's supply disruptions across the EU, including many Central European member states - expanding supplies of Russian gas to nearly 75 percent makes Poland even more dependent on a specific source and supplier.

Even if successful, shale-gas drilling may not be able to ease supply burdens or boost domestic reserves in the short-term, however, it can provide Poland with long-term opportunities to become more energy independent, attract diverse foreign partners and investors and perhaps even develop a viable energy-export sector.

Additionally, by pushing for greater demand side liberalization, especially natural gas, the government would allow for more competition and ease barriers to entry within Poland's domestic market.

Finally, development of a diverse and viable energy sector could provide Poland, as well as its Central European neighbors with the necessary momentum to engage in greater EU convergence efforts in energy security. Alternatively, Poland and other vulnerable markets across Europe risk pursuing policies that undermine EU integration, and worse yet, gamble with its energy future.

As we ease into a new year and a new decade, the question on many people's minds is who is in a better positioned to lead the global economic recovery, the EU or the US?

From the perspective of individual citizens, automatic stabilizers in Western Europe, have eased the short-term financial burden through generous unemployment, healthcare and other social welfare benefits.

In Central Europe, the picture is much different.

With many countries - from the Baltics to the Balkans - receiving either international financial assistance (much of it tied to strict austerity measures) or tasked with curbing ballooning budget deficits, public sector expenditures on pensions, healthcare, education and government salaries are all set to decrease.

In the US, despite the fiscal stimulus, a less generous social welfare system, risk averse credit markets and double digit unemployment has thus far restrained both individual consumption and large scale economic recovery.

That said, in the long-term, the US economy could emerge stronger. For one, it is more flexible, adapting more quickly to changes in the market, particularly when it comes to labor. Hiring and firing workers has less restrictions and regulations compared to Europe, especially the euro zone, which is already facing 10 percent (and potentially higher) unemployment figures.

Secondly unlike the EU, which lacks both uniform fiscal and industrial policies, the US recovery plan is more centralized via the federal government. Of course, the extent of the US recession and, therefore, recovery will vary from state to state, but overall once the US economy picks up, it will be felt throughout the majority of the country.

That will certainly not be the case in Europe, as individual EU member states are increasingly vying to protect national economic interests.

Most likely, Europe will see pockets of recovery. Among Central European economies Poland, the Czech Republic and Slovakia continue to have the most to look forward to in 2010.

In spite of relatively positive New Year's projections that estimate Poland's economy growing by approximately two percent in 2010 (one of Europe's highest rates), much of Poland's recovery will depend on successful growth within the euro zone. Currently, prospects remain challenging due to a looming European debt crisis.

By the end of 2009, bank lending across the euro zone decreased significantly, particularly to the private sector.

With the real estate market is still in decline and firms continuing to hold off hiring or making new investments, the EU economic engine seems stalled. In addition, ballooning public deficits in several euro-zone economies, including its newest (and first) Eastern members Slovakia and Slovenia, are simply unsustainable.

Not only do they threaten Europe's long-term recovery prospects, but they also raise the cost of borrowing (for both the public and private sectors) and increase the risk of inflation. This will surely affect Poland, which is dealing with its own widening public deficit as well as euro entry bid.

One major thorn in Europe's recovery is the lack of a common recovery plan. Regarding monetary policy among euro zone members, there is only so much that the European Central Bank can do. Unlike, the US, individual EU and euro zone member states, through independent fiscal and other stimulus policies, have set the recovery agenda and in many cases acted unilaterally out of self-interest rather than with the common market in mind.

Case in point is Italian carmaker Fiat considering relocating the production of its best-selling Panda back to Italy, despite Poland's lower labor and production costs, thereby addressing government demands of increasing Italy's domestic car production. Although Poland's recent success at avoiding large-scale recession rested on lower dependence on and exposure to euro zone export and credit markets, its recovery may be more closely tied to the euro zone's public debt balance and its members' short-term ability to get their fiscal houses in order.

The resignation of Poland's Environment Minister, Dr. Maciej Nowicki, highlights the growing difficulties governments face between meeting increased global environmental standards and ensuring long-term sustainable growth. Ultimately, this challenge presents governments, businesses and citizens with a complex set of choices.

For instance, should Poland (and other Central European economies) prioritize an aggressive green agenda over job creation and much-needed infrastructure development? Is one impossible without the other? Should growth rate limits be placed on Central Europe, which comprises the EU’s most rapidly developing economies but some of its biggest polluters?

As the global economy readjusts an unprecedented opportunity exists to develop a greener business environment. This will require considerable capital investments, structural changes, and public support for social trade-offs.

The front line of this debate resides in Europe’s eastern member states, particularly Poland, an economy that is heavily dependent on coal. The UN Climate Change conference currently taking place in Copenhagen aims to provide both the political capital and technical mechanisms best suited for the transformation into to a low-carbon world.

The move from economic crisis to green recovery will ultimately create winners and losers. What Central Europe’s governments need to assess is how best to incentivize the adoption of new technologies while acknowledging and gauging its affect on high-carbon industries.

Equally, they must identify the most effective metrics for success, be it funds invested, amount of CO2 reduced, or jobs created. Central Europe’s climate strategy also has bold implications for a variety of broader EU initiatives, including energy security, economic integration and future transatlantic relations. Without a clear directive from Copenhagen, Central Europe’s internal politics and domestic agendas threaten to derail progress on curbing climate change.

That, in the end, may be the region’s greatest obstacle to successful sustainable development.