During yesterday’s commemoration of the fall of the Berlin Wall as well as the fall communism throughout the Eastern bloc, Poland’s role and impact was prominently displayed.

The last two decades have resulted in sweeping political and economic transformations, culminating in NATO and EU membership. However, once the euphoria and self-congratulatory back-patting subside, what will be the next chapter in Poland’s modern history? How will Poland’s geopolitical role evolve over the coming decades? What are the key challenges facing Poland, both domestically and within a maturing European Union?

According to many leading experts, Poland is in its best geopolitical position in 300 or even 400 years, but simply does not know how to take advantage of it. Three key issues will test Poland in the near-term: energy security, economic sustainability and relations with its eastern neighbors. How it chooses to address these challenges will determine whether Poland lives up to its potential as an emerging mid-size European power or instead follows the path of some older and stagnant EU members.

Regarding energy security, Poland needs to maintain diversity of energy options, both in its sources and suppliers. It also needs to ensure that its energy sector maintains fair competition as well as free and open markets. By encouraging the EU to develop a southern energy corridor (beyond Nabucco), Poland and the rest of Central Europe will be able to simultaneously address fallout from the global economic crisis and impeding climate change.

Economically, Poland’s greatest hindrance is its low labor participation, due to high levels of early retirement. This will not only threaten future competitiveness, but will create enormous strains on the social welfare system. Poland needs to build off of the legacy of Solidarity and the success of previous market reforms by reinvesting in building a viable civil society and strong social (entrepreneurial) capital. This will not only deepen economic convergence within the EU, but create a set of best practices for other aspiring EU accession countries.

Finally, Poland’s relations with its eastern frontier (Belarus, Georgia, Ukraine, etc.) will play an increasingly critical role in Europe’s future common foreign and security policy. While the Eastern Partnership (EP), is neither a substitute for nor a guarantee of EU membership, the EU, and especially Poland, should play a bigger role in encouraging EP countries to speed up the pace of reform and meet EU laws and standards. By acting as a bridge between the Western EU members and the EP, Poland can not only share its own accession best practices, but enable EP countries to fortify their domestic security through greater political and economic cooperation with Europe.

From the looks of it, one would think that Polish officials have embarked on a US publicity tour. Fresh on the heels of Vice President Biden’s trip to Poland (one of several Central European stops), the future of US-Polish relations has once again re-emerged onto the Washington policy agenda.  This is happening, amidst the multitude of 20 year post-communist transition commemorations taking place throughout Washington DC’s embassies, think tanks and universities.

In addition to a high-level visit by Foreign Minister Radek Sikorski, Washington is hosting three separate conferences on the EU Eastern Partnership, lessons from post-communist economic transitions and future of US-Central European relations. In all three, from economics to energy and military security, Poland will be a prominent case study and its current and former government officials will be major participants.

These upcoming gatherings of key US, EU and Polish policymakers can set a major tone, affecting the future of US-Polish, US-EU, and international relations for years to come. A gathering of this magnitude at this point in world history is of great consequence, and an opportunity that should not be wasted.

Today, US Vice President Joe Biden arrives in Poland to reiterate America’s commitment to Eastern Europe’s peace and security. Critics have called the trip more of a public diplomacy tour to amend relations “reset” by last month’s missile-defense withdrawal. Meanwhile politicians in Poland continue to point fingers to determine who – if anybody – dropped the ball. As the political blame game bounces between Warsaw and Washington, Poland should instead take the Vice President’s visit as an opportunity to highlight its own laudable contributions to global security as key members of the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF).

To date Poland has deployed 2,000 troops to Afghanistan, with most stationed in the increasingly hostile eastern Ghazni province. Out of the 42 nations contributing military personnel, Poland has the sixth largest contingent – the highest for any non-G8 country. It even has more troops on the ground than Australia or the Netherlands.

As the US looks for additional troop reinforcements (the French have already declined) in response to the escalating Taliban insurgency, officials in Poland should make certain that existing Polish troops have the necessary equipment, training and backing – both from the US as well as other NATO allies – to successfully carry out their mission. Such an assessment is vital before making any additional troop commitments. To date 15 Polish soldiers have died, the two most recent on October 10th. More troops would also require additional funding, which is all the more challenging given Poland’s widening budget deficit.

While in Central Europe, the Vice President is sure to encounter additional questions and concerns regarding US commitment levels towards eastern Europe’s defense. If anything, Polish leaders should be sure to re-emphasize that Article 5 works both ways.

The past week has proven eventful for Poland. By ratifying the Lisbon Treaty, the Polish government not only became an official signatory to one of the EU’s most monumental transformations, but additionally quelled any remaining doubts over its long-term commitment to the European project. It also demonstrated Poland’s desire to improve its standing within the EU, boost its credibility on the international stage and gain legitimacy as an emerging mid-size European power.

In recent years Poles have sought recognition and respect from the international community for its decisive role in bringing about the end of communism, its successful accession to the EU and NATO and for having one of Central Europe’s most robust and stable economies.

Prudent policies prior to and during the global financial crisis showcase Poland’s potential for leadership and regional crisis management. Poland has recently demonstrated this by lending over $200 (zł.570) million to Iceland’s ailing banking sector as well as joining a consortium of donors to provide financial aid to Latvia.

During this weekend’s annual World Bank-IMF meetings in Istanbul, Poland’s delegation confirmed its interest in continuing to access broad-range lending, analytic and advisory services. Whether they are giving Poland a $20 (zł.57) billion flexible credit line, granting credits for Polish SMEs or lending to Poland for infrastructure development, the World Bank and IMF have re-emerged as important partners for Poland's economic growth and sustainability.

At the same time, Poland is seeking to increase both its financial (via increased donor contributions) and physical presence (increasing staff quotas) within the international financial institution. As leaders from emerging and developing economies call on the World Bank-IMF to redistribute voting and decision-making power, Poland (with the 18th highest nominal GDP) stands to benefit and should push to be at the front of the receiving line.

Corruption and nepotism, which had thrived throughout communist Central and Eastern Europe for decades, continues to this day.

Though attempts to unmask high-level corruption have improved, as demonstrated by the recent resignation of Sports Minister Mirosław Drzewiecki due to evidence presented by the Central Anti-Corruption Bureau (CBA), the majority of graft takes place at the local and municipal levels. This has long permeated Poland’s local justice system, tax authority, contract procurement, and university entrance and grading practices. 

However, unlike their Warsaw counterparts, local officials lack the required resources and personnel to address these challenges head on.

According to Transparency International’s 2008 Corruption Perceptions Index, Poland ranks 58th out of 180 countries surveyed. Among Central Europe’s EU members, it outranks only Romania and Bulgaria, two countries that have been openly criticized, even financially reprimanded by the EU for their inability to adequately tackle corruption, fraud and organized crime.

Recent events in Poland not only highlight the severity of the problem, but demonstrate that repercussions go beyond politics. Specifically, high levels of corruption negatively affect a country’s economic progress and development. For one, perceptions of corruption serve as disincentives for investors considering opening or sustaining business operations in Poland.

At a time when financial institutions and multinational firms are increasingly risk averse, higher corruption perceptions in Poland may make it increasingly expensive (and more competitive) to tap global capital markets or attract foreign direct investment. 

Both the Polish government and the EU need to take a more active role working with local and high-level officials in setting clear metrics for success. Poland must require greater transparency and follow through with legal enforcement, otherwise it risks not only its political, but also its economic legacy.